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From Social Experiment 
to Program
The Reemployment Bonus
Carl Davidson and Stephen A. Woodbury
This chapter examines the problem of transferring the results
obtained in the Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Washington reemployment
bonus experiments to an actual reemployment bonus program.   The
results presented in the preceding three chapters suggest that a reem-
ployment bonus program could reduce the duration of insured unem-
ployment without adverse consequences for workers offered the bonus.
On the whole, the results appear to be “internally valid”—that is, com-
parisons between the treatment and control groups generally provide
unbiased estimates of the bonus impacts.
Experimental results alone, however, do not indicate whether
implementing a  reemployment bonus program would be desirable.
Important questions still exist about the extent to which bonus experi-
ments are “transferable” and give an accurate picture of what would
happen if a bonus program were actually adopted.   In any social exper-
iment, whether experimental results are transferable to an actual pro-
gram (“externally valid”) is distinct from whether the results are valid
on their own grounds (internally valid).   The first section of this chap-
ter develops a model-based classification of the problems that impede
the transfer of experimental results to a policy setting.   
In the second section, we characterize an equilibrium-matching
model of the labor market that provides an organizing framework for
analyzing the problems of transferring the reemployment bonus exper-
iments’ results to the setting of an actual program.  (The full model is
presented in the chapter appendix.)  This section also presents the main
results on spillover effects, classification changes, and behavioral
changes that could follow adoption of a bonus program.   The third sec-
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tion explores how the outcomes of a program that offered a bonus only
to dislocated workers could differ from those observed in the bonus
experiments.  We also discuss how exogenous changes in economic
and labor market conditions may alter the effectiveness of a reemploy-
ment bonus program.   The final section summarizes the chapter’s
methods and main results.
THE TRANSFERABILITY PROBLEM IN THE 
REEMPLOYMENT BONUS EXPERIMENTS
A well-designed social experiment can offer a high degree of con-
trol over the variables that influence outcomes such as unemployment
duration and earnings after reemployment, and as a result can yield
unbiased, readily understandable, and convincing estimates of the
impact of an economic incentive on behavior.  A variety of problems
may hamper the transfer of experimental results to what could be
expected of an actual program, however.  Existing treatments of the
transferability of experimental results include Aigner (1985), Spiegel-
man and Woodbury (1990), Garfinkel, Manski, and Michalopoulos
(1992), Moffitt (1992a), Davidson and Woodbury (1993), and Meyer
(1995).  However, there is no generally accepted categorization of
problems underlying the transferability of experimental results.
Accordingly, we offer the following catalog of transferability prob-
lems, based on the labor market model that we use to investigate those
problems.
Briefly, the results of implementing an actual program may differ
from the effects of a treatment as estimated in a social experiment for
five reasons.  
1) Spillover effects—the possibility that workers who respond to the
bonus program would make it more difficult for other workers to
find employment (that is, would crowd out or displace other
workers from employment).
2) Classification changes without efficiency implications—in partic-
ular, the possibilities that if a program were adopted, more bonus-
qualified workers would actually collect a bonus and more work-
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ers eligible for unemployment insurance (UI) would claim bene-
fits in order to collect a bonus.
3) Behavioral changes with efficiency implications—the possibility
that under an actual bonus program, an increasing share of bonus-
offered workers would participate and respond to the bonus offer
by increasing their job-search intensity.
4) Scale effects—the possibility that program outcomes would differ
from experimental outcomes if a bonus program were offered to a
different population or adopted on a different scale than the
experiments.
5) Exogenous economic changes—the possibility that different eco-
nomic or labor market circumstances, which may not have been
adequately controlled for in the experiments, would yield pro-
gram outcomes that differed from the experimental outcomes.
Table 6.1 lists these five transferability problems and notes the features
of the model that allow us to account for them.  Each problem is dis-
cussed in turn.
Spillover Effects
Experimental impacts are usually estimated only for the subgroup
of the population that would be eligible for the program, but a program
may have indirect or spillover effects on other groups of workers.  For
example, an experimental training program to upgrade the skills of
workers could improve the employment and earnings of the program’s
participants at the expense of workers who don’t participate and who
would have gotten jobs in the absence of the program.  This “crowding
out” of nonparticipants by participants is especially likely if the train-
ing program were implemented in a local labor market where there
were few job vacancies.
A reemployment bonus has the clear potential for a spillover or
crowding-out effect.  Reemployment bonuses are intended to increase
the search intensity of the UI claimants who have been offered
bonuses.  An effective bonus offer would drive bonus-offered claimants
to find job vacancies earlier (on average) than otherwise.  As a result,
part of the improved labor market performance of bonus-offered work-
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ers would be at the expense of workers who were not offered bonuses.
Some non-offered workers would, in effect, be crowded out of employ-
ment as a result of the bonus program and would experience longer
spells of unemployment and a higher unemployment rate.1
Because of the difficulties in estimating crowding out in an experi-
mental design, we have modeled the crowding out of a reemployment
bonus program using an equilibrium search and matching model
(Davidson and Woodbury 1993, 2000).  In the model discussed in the
appendix, which is based on our earlier work, the crowding-out effects
of the reemployment bonus differ across various groups of job seekers.
In particular, we distinguish among crowding out of job seekers who
are offered the bonus but don’t respond to it, job seekers who have
been offered a bonus but whose bonus qualification period has expired
(that is, UI-eligible job seekers whose spells of unemployment extend
beyond the bonus qualification period), and job seekers who are never
offered the bonus (both UI-eligible nonclaimants and UI-ineligible job
seekers, such as new labor force entrants and re-entrants).  We also
check the sensitivity of the crowding-out estimates to variation in the
Table 6.1 Transferability Problems and Features of the Model that Allow 
Them to Be Analyzed
Effect or change considered Features of the model
Spillover effects Multiple groups of workers/parameters 
characterizing workers’ behavior and 
responses to changing incentives
Classification changes without 
efficiency implications
Multiple groups of workers
Behavioral changes with 
efficiency implications
Parameters characterizing workers’ 
behavior and responses to changing 
incentives
Scale effects Multiple groups of workers/parameters 
characterizing workers’ behavior and 
responses to changing incentives
Exogenous economic changes Parameters characterizing the labor 
market and constraints facing workers
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UI take-up rate and the bonus take-up rate—that is, to changes in the
proportion of UI-eligible workers who claim their benefits and changes
in the proportion of bonus-qualifiers who actually collect a bonus for
which they qualify.
Spillover effects have real consequences for employment, unem-
ployment, resource allocation, and efficiency.  That is, spillovers imply
that the economic prospects of those who do not participate in a pro-
gram are harmed by the improved situation of program participants.
For that reason, spillover effects are more serious than, for example,
classification changes (such as changes in the bonus take-up rate, the
proportion of bonus-qualified workers who collect a bonus), which
have measured impacts but do not have economic or efficiency
impacts.  Spillover effects are discussed further on pp. 188–190.
Classification Changes without Efficiency Implications
A program’s take-up rate may differ from the take-up rate observed
in an experiment; that is, a greater percentage of individuals who are
eligible to receive a benefit may choose to collect the benefit once a
permanent program is implemented.  These are classification changes
without efficiency implications because they represent changes in the
way workers classify themselves but require no change in underlying
economic behavior (such as a change in job-search intensity).
Although they will change the government’s cost of financing a pro-
gram, classification changes have no effect on economic outcomes or
resource allocation.
It is well-known that less than 100 percent of the individuals who
are eligible to collect benefits under social programs actually do so.
For example, available estimates suggest that only between 55 and 75
percent of workers who are eligible to claim UI benefits do so, and it
was seen in Chapter 3 that only one-half to two-thirds of the workers
who qualified for a bonus in the Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Washington
experiments actually collected a bonus.
The concern is that some workers would reclassify themselves in
one of two ways if a bonus program were adopted.  Consider first UI-
eligible workers with short expected durations of unemployment who
used to find that the costs of claiming UI outweighed the benefits.
After adoption of a bonus program, these UI-eligible nonclaimants
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could, with no change in job-search intensity or timing of reemploy-
ment, become UI-eligible claimants and receive both UI benefits and a
bonus.  This would be observed as increases in the UI take-up rate  (the
proportion of UI-eligible workers who claim benefits), the bonus take-
up rate, and the financial cost of providing benefits and bonuses to
claimants.  Second, once a bonus program were adopted, a higher per-
centage of workers who qualify for a bonus might collect one.  This
would be observed as increases in the bonus take-up rate and the finan-
cial cost of providing bonuses.  Both of these are “classification
changes” because either could occur if workers reclassified them-
selves; that is, if they claimed benefits or collected a bonus without any
change in job-search behavior or the timing of reemployment.
Classification changes pose a problem for the validity of experi-
mental estimates of the financial cost of a bonus program.  If either the
UI take-up rate or the bonus take-up rate increased after program adop-
tion, the government’s cost of the UI program would increase.  In other
words, classification changes would lead to measurable differences
between the financial cost of the experiments and the financial cost of a
program.
However, classification changes would not lead to differences
between the employment and unemployment outcomes of an experi-
ment and those of a bonus program.  The reason, as already noted, is
that no change in economic behavior—job-search intensity or timing
of reemployment—would be required in order to effect these classifica-
tion changes.  Unlike spillover effects and the other effects considered,
classification changes have only measured impacts on the govern-
ment’s cost of the program.  They have no consequences for resource
allocation and efficiency.  Classification changes without efficiency
implications are discussed further on pp. 191–195.
Behavioral Changes with Efficiency Implications
The responses of workers to an actual program may differ from
their responses during an experiment for several reasons (which are not
necessarily mutually exclusive).  First, social experiments are inevita-
bly of limited duration.  If participants’ planning horizons exceed the
length of an experiment, then the behavior of participants during the
experiment may differ from what it would be if the program were
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adopted.  This can be thought of as a time-horizon effect.  Time-hori-
zon effects posed a concern for the income maintenance experiments of
the 1960s and 1970s because participants may have been reluctant to
give up jobs and adjust their labor supply in response to an experimen-
tal (and hence short-term) negative income tax system.  If a negative
income tax program were adopted, participants might make long-term
adjustments that differed from the short-term adjustments observed
during the experiment.
The time-horizon problem could be a concern in transferring the
results of the reemployment bonus experiments to an actual program.
For example, it is possible that bonus-offered claimants viewed the
experimental bonus offer as evanescent—an offer that would be avail-
able only during the current spell of unemployment and never again.  If
so, then claimants might be prone to respond to and collect a bonus
under the experiment, whereas they might not do so under a bonus pro-
gram.  As a result, the bonus effects estimated in an experiment could
be larger than those in an actual program, although it is difficult to
gauge by how much.
A second reason for differences between behavior during an exper-
iment and under an actual program is the learning effect.  Learning
effects are changes in behavior that may occur as program participants
learn more about the workings of a program.  Such changes may occur
as participants become more convinced of the authenticity and perma-
nence of a program, as they become increasingly aware of the conse-
quences of their behavior under the program, or because it takes time
for participants to make adjustments and rearrangements in response to
new incentives.2
If a program is subject to learning effects, then a short-term experi-
ment may be an incomplete guide to what could be expected under an
actual program.  In general, the existence of learning effects implies
that experimental results will underestimate the long-run response to a
fully implemented program because, under an actual program, partici-
pants would have enough time to understand fully and respond to the
incentives created by a program.  There is some evidence that learning
effects may have been a problem in the Illinois bonus experiment.  In a
follow-up survey of a random sample of UI claimants who were
offered the Illinois bonus, about one-third of those who refused to par-
ticipate in the experiment indicated that failure to understand or trust
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the experiment was the reason for refusal (Spiegelman and Woodbury
1987, Chapter 7).  This was the case even though the bonus offer was
simple to understand, its credibility was easily established, and partici-
pants needed little time to adapt or respond to the program.
A third reason for behavioral changes after adoption of a program
would be changes in norms that occur over time after adoption of a
program.  Especially with an income transfer program like welfare,
social norms may make it difficult for many individuals to participate,
at least when a program is first adopted.  It is possible that some bonus-
offered claimants chose not to respond to the bonus offer because they
felt some stigma attached to doing so—they would be taking a bribe to
accept a job, perhaps.  However, there is little evidence of such stigma
in the responses to follow-up questions that were put to bonus-offered
workers in Illinois (Spiegelman and Woodbury 1987, Chapter 7).
As with spillover effects, behavioral changes have consequences
for employment, unemployment, and efficiency.  For example, if a
higher proportion of bonus-offered workers responded to a bonus by
increasing their job-search intensity, then bonus-offered workers as a
group would experience shorter spells of unemployment and increased
employment.  Such behavioral changes with efficiency implications are
discussed further (pp. 192–195).
Scale Effects
There may be differences between an experiment and a program
that result because a program is adopted on a different scale (either
larger or smaller) than the scale on which the experiment was con-
ducted.  Scale effects could result because a program is adopted across
a wider (or narrower) geographical area than in an experiment or
because it is implemented for different groups of individuals (or more
or fewer groups of individuals) than in an experiment.  Such differ-
ences in scale may again result in differences between experimental
results and the outcomes of an actual program.
Typically, the scale of an actual program is larger than that of an
experiment, as would occur if bonus offers were made to all new UI
claimants rather than only to randomly assigned claimants in certain
geographic areas.  Increased scale could affect the outcomes of a reem-
ployment bonus program, for example, by changing the likelihood of
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crowding out, or by extending the bonus offer to groups of workers
who had been ineligible for experimental bonus offers and whose
behavioral responses differed from the groups who were tested.
However, a reemployment bonus program could also be adopted
on a smaller scale than the experiments.  For example, it would be fea-
sible (and consistent with the goals of a bonus offer) to limit bonus
offers to dislocated workers or workers who are believed to be potential
UI exhaustees.  An important feature of the Washington reemployment
bonus experiment was to test whether dislocated and other workers
responded differently to the bonus offer.  The results suggested no
important difference between the two groups (Spiegelman, O’Leary,
and Kline 1992), but there could be scale effects if, by offering the
bonus to a relatively small group of workers, the overall increase in
job-search intensity induced by the bonus program were relatively
small.  A small increase in search intensity would lead to a relatively
small increase in overall employment and the possibility of greater
crowding out of workers who are not offered a bonus.  These implica-
tions are developed further on pp. 195–198.
Exogenous Economic Changes
The economic conditions under which a program is implemented
may differ from the economic conditions that prevailed during an
experiment.  Fully controlling for differences in economic conditions
during an experiment may be difficult or impossible, but failing to do
so may lead to experimental estimates that differ from the outcomes of
the program.
In terms of the model used below, exogenous economic changes
amount to changes in parameters that characterize the labor market.  In
principle, adequate data and modeling should allow us to explain dif-
ferences across the experiments in Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Wash-
ington and to predict the circumstances under which the bonus will be
most effective.  
Results presented in Chapter 4 of this volume (Table 4.6) suggest
that, in Pennsylvania and Washington, the effect of a reemployment
bonus offer was greater at sites where labor market conditions were
good.  This finding poses a puzzle—the bonus impact was greater in
Illinois than in either Pennsylvania or Washington, even though labor
184 Davidson and Woodbury
market conditions appear to have been worst in Illinois.  The issue of
labor market conditions and the efficacy of the reemployment bonus
are discussed further on pp. 198–201.
Remarks on Internal Validity
The five problems discussed above all come under the heading of
external validity or transferability.  Other pitfalls in social experimenta-
tion involve internal validity; that is, ensuring that the comparison
between the control and experimental groups is unbiased.  Internal
validity is prior to the questions of transferability; it is a necessary but
not sufficient condition for transferability of experimental results to a
program setting.  The most commonly cited problem of internal valid-
ity is the so-called Hawthorne effect, which occurs if subjects respond
to an unintended treatment rather than to the designed treatment.  The
Hawthorne effect takes its name from experiments at the Hawthorne
plant of Western Electric Company (in Chicago), where changes in
lighting and room color were made to determine their effects on pro-
ductivity.  The experimenters found that productivity improved, but
they discovered that the improvements resulted from the increased
attention that was paid to workers whose work spaces were changed
rather than from the tested changes in lighting and color.
A Hawthorne effect could have existed in the reemployment bonus
experiments if participants increased the intensity of their job search
because they felt they were being watched or wanted to please those
conducting the experiment, rather than in response to the bonus offer.
A Hawthorne effect seems unlikely in the reemployment bonus experi-
ments for two reasons.  First, in the Illinois bonus experiment, there
were actually two treatments: the claimant bonus (in which new UI
claimants were offered a $500 bonus to become rapidly reemployed)
and an employer bonus, in which a random sample of new UI claim-
ants was instructed to tell each prospective employer that he or she (the
prospective employer) would receive a $500 bonus for hiring the
claimant within 11 weeks of the initial claim.  This employer bonus
showed quite small effects, whereas the bonus offer to claimants
showed significant effects (Woodbury and Spiegelman 1987).  If the
impacts of the bonus offer to claimants were merely a Hawthorne
effect, then the employer bonus should have turned up significant
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effects.  Hence, the Illinois experiment itself provides evidence that the
impacts of the bonus offer to claimants were not the result of a Haw-
thorne effect.  Second, in both the Pennsylvania and Washington exper-
iments, several treatments were offered, with various bonus amounts
and qualification periods.  As discussed in Chapter 4, the bonus treat-
ments were related to outcomes in predictable ways that suggest that
economic incentives, rather than Hawthorne effects, were at work in
the experiments.
SPILLOVER EFFECTS, CLASSIFICATION CHANGES, 
AND BEHAVIORAL CHANGES FOLLOWING ADOPTION 
OF A BONUS PROGRAM
In the chapter appendix, we develop a model that provides a frame-
work for evaluating and quantifying the differences between the out-
comes of the reemployment bonus experiments and what could be
expected in an actual program.  The model considers four well-defined
groups of workers who exhibit optimizing behavior.  It includes param-
eters characterizing the labor market and various constraints facing
workers and parameters characterizing the preferences of workers and
governing their responses to changed incentives.  Changes in behavior
that were observed in the reemployment bonus experiments are used to
calibrate the model; that is, the behavioral impacts of the bonus experi-
ment are used to gauge important and otherwise unobservable behav-
ioral parameters.  Once the model is calibrated, it is possible to
simulate how various outcomes—such as unemployment duration and
employment—would be altered if groups other than bonus-offered
workers were affected by a bonus program or if bonus-offered workers
behaved differently in a program than during the experiment.  Direct
observation of these effects, were it possible, would be preferable to
the modeling approach taken here.  Absent direct observation, however,
the model provides a framework for analyzing the transferability prob-
lem and for roughly quantifying impacts that cannot be observed in an
experiment.3
In the model, the bonus offer increases the opportunity cost of
unemployment for bonus-offered workers, and some bonus-offered
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workers respond by increasing the intensity of their job search.  This
increase in search intensity has the following implications.  First, there
is an increase in overall steady-state employment.  That is, more of the
total available jobs are filled as the bonus-offered workers who respond
to the offer search harder for jobs and accept jobs that would otherwise
have remained vacant.  Second, reemployment probabilities and
employment levels rise for bonus-offered workers who respond to the
offer, and they fall for all other workers, who are beaten to vacancies
and crowded out of the labor market by the more aggressive workers
who respond to the bonus offer.  In general, the larger the increase in
overall steady-state employment, the less crowding out will occur.4
These impacts of the bonus offer can be thought of respectively as
a gross employment effect and a crowding-out effect.  Note that the
gross employment effect is an increase in total employment that is
driven by the increase in search effort of workers who respond to the
bonus offer.  The increase in employment of these responders is offset
at least partially by decreases in employment of other groups of work-
ers—the crowding-out effect.
From the standpoint of analyzing the transferability of the bonus
experiments’ results to an actual program, the model has three main
features.  First, it breaks workers into four groups: 1) UI-ineligibles, 2)
UI-eligibles who claim their benefits and respond to the bonus, 3) UI-
eligibles who claim their benefits and fail to respond to the bonus, and
4) UI-eligible nonclaimants (see Figure 6.A1 and the accompanying
discussion in the appendix).  This breakdown lets us consider the
impact of the bonus on groups other than those offered the bonus (UI-
ineligibles and UI-eligible nonclaimants) and on workers who,
although offered the bonus, do not respond.  As a result, the model pro-
vides a way of understanding spillover effects.  In the case of the reem-
ployment bonus, crowding out is the most important spillover; that is,
the bonus program tends to prolong the unemployment spells and
reduce the employment of workers who are not offered or do not
respond to the bonus.
Second, the model allows for variation in the UI take-up rate,
defined as the proportion of UI-eligible unemployed workers who
claim their benefits (denoted by k in the model).  A concern raised
about a reemployment bonus program is that it could lead to an
increased UI take-up rate, which has hovered around 65 percent for the
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past 20 years.  Increased UI take-up would involve the reclassification
of workers, increasing the government’s cost of the reemployment
bonus program but leaving the real economic outcomes of the program
unchanged.  Because the UI take-up rate is a parameter in the model,
the model provides a way of showing that the real economic outcomes
of a bonus program would be unchanged if the UI take-up rate were to
rise.
Third, the model specifies and distinguishes between the reem-
ployment bonus response rate (defined as the proportion of bonus-
offered workers who respond to the bonus by increasing their search
intensity, denoted by ρ in the model) and the reemployment bonus
take-up rate (defined as the proportion of workers who qualify for a
bonus who actually collect it, denoted by τ in the model).  The bonus
response rate cannot be observed, but inclusion of the bonus take-up
rate (which is observable) in the model allows us to identify and solve
for the bonus response rate.  Once solved for, the bonus response rate
can be varied exogenously to gauge how the outcomes of a bonus pro-
gram would differ if the bonus response rate increased.  This allows
examination of how an important behavioral change would affect the
outcomes of a bonus program.
Because we refer to the above three parameters frequently in the
following discussion, their definitions are repeated here: 
k—the UI take-up rate, defined as the proportion of UI-eligible
unemployed workers who claim their UI benefits;
ρ—the reemployment bonus response rate, defined as the propor-
tion of bonus-offered workers who respond to the bonus by
increasing their search intensity;
τ—the reemployment bonus take-up rate, defined as the proportion
of workers who qualify for a bonus who actually collect it.
Distinctions among these three parameters are important and worth
highlighting.  A change in the bonus response rate (ρ) represents a
change in behavior that has implications for employment, unemploy-
ment, and earnings—that is, implications for real economic outcomes
and efficiency.  In other words, changes in ρ are behavioral changes
with efficiency implications.  Changes in the UI and bonus take-up
rates (k and τ), on the other hand, result in measured changes only,
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such as changes in bonus payouts and (consequently) the government’s
cost of financing UI or a reemployment bonus program.  In other
words, changes in k and τ are classification changes without efficiency
implications.
Spillover Effects
In the context of a reemployment bonus, the main spillover effect
that has concerned policymakers is crowding out.  Our goal is to gauge
the seriousness of crowding out and to illustrate the extent to which
variations in the UI take-up rate (k) and the bonus take-up rate (τ)
affect estimates of crowding out.  To do so, we solve the model for var-
ious values of k and τ and compare the results.  The results are reported
in Table 6.2.
Column 1 of Table 6.2 shows the model’s predictions of how a
bonus program would affect employment and the duration of unem-
ployment, assuming that all UI-eligible workers claim benefits and all
who qualify for a bonus collect it.5   Both of these underlying assump-
tions are clearly unrealistic.  In this case, for every job gained by UI-
eligibles, 0.39 job is lost by UI-ineligibles (138/351 = 0.39).  We refer
to this as the crowding-out ratio—the ratio of employment losses suf-
fered by groups that lose employment to employment gains of the
group that benefits from the bonus offer.  Note also that the average
spell of unemployment of UI-ineligibles would lengthen by 0.27 week.
These results suggest that, although a bonus program would entail
some crowding out, the amount would be rather small.
Column 2 reports results when we assume (more realistically) that
the UI take-up rate is 65 percent, and (still unrealistically) that the
bonus take-up rate is 100 percent.  Column 2 suggests that crowding
out is now more serious: for every job gained by UI-eligible claimants,
0.60 job is lost by the losers (i.e., the crowding-out ratio is now (96 +
78)/292 = 0.60).  Note that the employment losses suffered by those
not offered the bonus are split about equally between UI-eligible non-
claimants and UI-ineligibles.
Column 3 reports results when we again assume a UI take-up rate
of 65 percent but now assume a bonus take-up rate of 55 percent (as
occurred in the Illinois bonus experiment).  Crowding out is now even
greater: for every job gained by bonus-offered workers who respond to
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the bonus, 0.76 job is lost by bonus-offered workers who ignore the
bonus offer, UI-eligible nonclaimants, and UI-ineligibles (that is, the
crowding-out ratio is [118 + 103 + 94]/415 = 0.76).  Again, the
employment losses suffered by those not offered the bonus are split
about equally among the three groups of losers.
Why does the crowding-out ratio progressively increase as the
assumptions are made more “realistic”?  Consider first column 1.  In
Table 6.2 Changes in Employment and in Duration of Unemployment 
Resulting from a $500 Reemployment Bonusa
UI take-up rate (k) 100% 65% 65% 65%
Bonus take-up rate (τ) 100% 100% 55% 55%





































Net increase in 
employment (J)
213 118 100 213
Crowding-out ratiob 0.39 0.60 0.76 0.64
ρ (bonus response 
rate)c
— — 0.488 0.55
a The top number in a pair of values is the change in employment per 100,000 labor-
force participants; the number in parentheses is the change in unemployment duration
in weeks.  The group that gains from the reemployment bonus offer in each case is
shown by an asterisk (*).  Values are based on simulations described in the text.
b The crowding-out ratio is the ratio of employment losses suffered by groups that lose
employment to employment gains of the group that benefits from the bonus offer. 
c In column 3, the bonus response rate (ρ) is retrieved from the observed bonus
impacts; in column 4, it is set to 0.55, the calibration from column 3 is retained, and
the employment changes and changes in duration of unemployment are solved.
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this case, we assume that all UI-eligible workers claim their benefits
and respond to the bonus.  This means that 40 percent of all unem-
ployed workers increase their search effort during the first six 2-week
periods of unemployment.  A direct result of this increase in search
effort is an increase in overall employment; that is, more of the econ-
omy’s total available jobs (F) are filled—J rises and V falls.  This
increase in employment allows the UI-eligibles to obtain jobs with rel-
atively little crowding out of UI-ineligibles.
The results in column 2 suggest that crowding out would be larger
in the presence of a UI take-up rate of only 65 percent.  Because, in this
case, 35 percent of UI-eligibles do not claim their benefits, fewer work-
ers are offered the bonus, and there is less scope for the bonus offer to
alter behavior.  In other words, fewer workers have increased their
search effort as a result of the bonus offer.  When fewer workers claim
their UI benefits and respond to the bonus offer, employment increases
by less as a result of the bonus offer (that is, J rises by less and V falls
by less), and more of the increase in UI-eligible employment must
come at the expense of other workers.
Finally, in column 3, it is again the case that 35 percent of UI-eligi-
ble workers do not claim their benefits (and hence are never offered the
bonus).  In addition, of the UI-eligible workers who do claim benefits
and qualify for a bonus, only 55 percent collect the bonus.  This
implies that even fewer workers increase their search effort as a result
of the bonus, and employment increases relatively little as a result.  It
follows that even more (over 75 percent) of the increase in employment
for bonus recipients comes at the expense of other workers.  The results
reported in column 3 indicate that the UI-eligible claimants who do not
respond to the bonus suffer the largest drop in employment.  Why?
Because these workers are receiving UI, they do not search as hard as
UI-ineligibles.  Also, they face a harder time finding a job than UI-eli-
gible nonclaimants (because, by assumption, UI-eligible nonclaimants
have higher reemployment probabilities).  Thus, the workers who make
the least effort to find a job are harmed the most.
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Changes in the UI Take-Up Rate: 
Classification Change without Efficiency Implications
Only 55 to 75 percent of the unemployed workers who are eligible
to receive UI benefits actually claim them (Blank and Card 1991; Vro-
man 1991).  Meyer (1995, pp. 108–110) argued that adoption of a
bonus program could induce more UI-eligible workers to claim their
benefits and hence would increase the UI take-up rate.  In particular,
for a worker expecting a short spell of unemployment and facing a low
UI replacement rate, the existence of the bonus for rapid reemployment
might make it worthwhile to claim benefits where, in the absence of a
bonus, the benefits of claiming UI benefits might not outweigh the
costs.  Meyer referred to this as an “entry effect” because workers
would in effect enter the UI program in response to a change in the pro-
gram.  He suggested that a bonus the size of the Illinois bonus would
lead to a 7 to 12 percent increase in the UI take-up rate.6
We previously referred to such effects generally as classification
changes without efficiency implications.  This is because workers who
newly chose to claim UI benefits (that is, reclassified themselves from
UI-eligible nonclaimants to UI-eligible claimants) in order to take
advantage of the bonus offer would behave no differently after the
change than they did before.  Workers who claimed UI benefits in
response to the bonus would generally be workers with short expected
durations of unemployment for whom the advantages of claiming ben-
efits were previously not enough to outweigh the costs.7  For such
workers, the bonus offer tips the benefit-cost balance in favor of claim-
ing benefits, but no change in behavior (apart from claiming benefits) is
needed for these workers to receive benefits and collect a bonus—they
would behave as they would have in the absence of a bonus, experienc-
ing a short spell of unemployment.8
Another way of viewing this point is to compare columns 1 and 2
of Table 6.2.  The net increase in employment resulting from the bonus
is estimated to be 213 per 100,000 labor-force participants when the UI
take-up rate is 100 percent (column 1) but only 118 per 100,000 when
the UI take-up rate is 65 percent (column 2).  It is tempting to argue
that, if the UI take-up rate increased following adoption of a bonus pro-
gram, then the benefits of the bonus program (in terms of increased
employment) would rise, but that would not be correct.  Workers classi-
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fied as UI-eligible nonclaimants in column 2 would be reclassified as
UI-eligible claimants if they claimed benefits in response to the bonus
offer, but their job-search behavior would be unchanged.  As a result,
employment gains among UI-eligible claimants would fall, as would
employment losses among UI-eligible nonclaimants.  These offsetting
changes would be measured changes only—there would be no real
change in economic outcomes.
It follows that, although the increased UI take-up rate that would
result from adopting a bonus program would increase the total payout
of the UI system (weekly benefits plus bonuses), it would not affect
efficiency or resource allocation.  That is, it would not reduce the real
economic benefits of the bonus program, which stem from employ-
ment increases that are induced by the bonus.  Although the cost of the
UI program would rise as a result of increased UI take-up, the increase
would amount to an income transfer—a cost to the program but not to
society.9
Changes in the Bonus Response and Take-Up Rates
Fewer than half of the individuals who are eligible to participate in
social programs such as Aid to Families with Dependent Children and
job training programs actually do so.  Why this is true is one of the
least understood aspects of social programs (Moffitt 1992a,b; Heckman
and Smith 1995).  Similarly, only 55 percent of the workers who quali-
fied for a bonus in the Illinois bonus experiment chose to collect the
bonus.  It is difficult to explain why this should be the case, as was seen
in Chapter 3.  Moreover, there is no way of directly observing the pro-
portion of workers who changed their behavior in response to the
bonus offer and intensified their job search.
These points lead to one of the most difficult issues in analyzing
the transferability of the bonus experiments’ results to an actual pol-
icy—the possibility that the response to an actual bonus program
would be greater (or less) than occurred during the experimental dem-
onstrations.  Changes in response, which we define as changes in the
proportion of workers who show a behavioral response to the bonus
offer, could occur with the adoption of a reemployment bonus program
for a variety of reasons.  If there are learning effects associated with a
bonus offer—for example, it takes time for some UI claimants to
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understand or trust the bonus offer, as suggested by the available sur-
vey evidence—then response to a bonus program might be greater than
response to the experiments.  In our discussion of transferability prob-
lems in the first section of this chapter, these problems came under the
heading of behavioral changes with efficiency implications because in
the context of our model they will take the form of a change in a behav-
ioral parameter, ρ, defined as the proportion of workers who respond to
the bonus by increasing their job search intensity.
As already noted, the model includes the bonus take-up rate (τ, the
proportion of bonus qualifiers who collect a bonus) as a parameter.
Unlike ρ (the bonus response rate), τ can be observed.  Inclusion of the
bonus take-up rate in the model allows us to identify the bonus
response rate.  To see this, note first that Equation 27 in the appendix
defines τ as the ratio of a) those who responded to and collected the
bonus to b) those who qualified for a bonus by receiving 11 or fewer
weeks of UI benefits.  Next, recall that about 55 percent of the workers
who qualified for the $500 reemployment bonus in Illinois actually col-
lected it.  This observation allows us to impose an additional constraint
on the model that identifies the bonus response rate.
Column 3 of Table 6.2 shows the results of setting the bonus take-
up rate (τ) equal to 55 percent (rather than 100 percent as in columns 1
and 2) and then solving the model to obtain an estimate of ρ.  The esti-
mate is about 49 percent—that is, roughly half of the UI claimants who
were offered the $500 bonus in the Illinois experiment actually
changed their behavior as a result of the bonus offer.  This is an esti-
mate of the proportion of workers who responded to the bonus offer
whether or not they succeeded in shortening their spell of unemploy-
ment enough to qualify for the bonus.  The estimate also accounts for
(that is, excludes) workers who collected a bonus without respond-
ing—that is, workers who would have been unemployed for less than
11 weeks in any event and for whom the $500 bonus was a windfall.10
Column 3 also yields an estimate of the average reduction in unem-
ployment duration of the workers who responded to the bonus.  This
estimated reduction is 1.7 weeks, more than twice the 0.7-week reduc-
tion for all workers who were offered the bonus.  Bonus-offered work-
ers who ignored the bonus offer had slightly longer spells of unem-
ployment, according to the model.
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The model can also be used to gain insight into what would happen
if the bonus response rate were to rise after adoption of a bonus pro-
gram.  To do so, the bonus response rate (ρ) is treated as a parameter
and imposed exogenously rather than solved for as in column 3.  In col-
umn 4, a bonus response rate of 55 percent is imposed—about 6 per-
centage points (or 10 percent) higher than our estimate of ρ from
column 3.  The higher bonus response rate significantly changes pro-
gram outcomes.  With a higher response rate, the employment
increases of claimants who respond to the bonus are much larger (599
per 100,000 rather than 415 per 100,000), although in absolute terms
the crowding out of other groups of workers is also greater.  In relative
terms, though, crowding out is less when the bonus response rate is
higher; the crowding-out ratio is 0.64 in column 4 versus 0.76 in col-
umn 3.
Note also that, with the 10 percent increase in the bonus response
rate, the net increase in jobs more than doubles from 100 per 100,000
to 213 per 100,000.  These gains occur because, when the response to
the bonus is larger, job vacancies are filled more quickly and steady-
state employment increases.  All of these gains go to UI claimants who
respond to the bonus.
Note that existing data provide no way of estimating how (or
whether) either the bonus take-up rate (τ) or the bonus response rate (ρ)
would change if a bonus program were adopted.  Nevertheless, some
observations can be made about what would occur if either τ or ρ
changed following adoption of a bonus program.  First, a change in the
τ is a classification change without efficiency implications.  An
increased bonus take-up rate implies that more of the workers who
qualify for the bonus actually collect it.  It implies no change in the job-
search intensity or timing of reemployment of bonus-offered workers
and hence has no effect on “real” program outcomes, such as employ-
ment or crowding out.  An increase in the bonus take-up rate increases
the payout of bonuses to UI claimants, leads to additional income trans-
fers, and increases the UI system’s costs.  In other words, increases in
the bonus take-up rate are like the increases in the UI take-up rate (k)—
they have implications for the finances of the bonus program but no
implications for efficiency or resource allocation.
In contrast, an increase in the bonus response rate is a behavioral
change with efficiency implications; that is, an increase in ρ changes
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real program outcomes.  An increased response to the bonus leads to
larger increases in net employment and reduced crowding out (com-
pare columns 3 and 4 in Table 6.2).  In other words, the results suggest
that increases in the bonus response rate would improve the function-
ing of the program by leading to both greater employment gains and
reduced crowding out.
DISLOCATED WORKERS AND 
EXOGENOUS ECONOMIC FACTORS
Limiting a Bonus Program to Dislocated Workers
If a bonus program were implemented, one likely option would be
to offer bonuses only to specific groups of workers, such as dislocated
workers (that is, workers who had seniority of at least three years with
the employer who laid them off).  Indeed, administrative rules pro-
posed by the Clinton Administration in 1994 enabled state employment
security agencies to offer a reemployment bonus to workers who meet
the state’s “profiling” criteria—that is, to workers predicted to have a
high probability of exhausting their UI benefits.11
Implementing a bonus program on such a restricted basis poses a
potentially serious problem for transferring the results of the bonus
experiments to actual policy.  In all three of the bonus experiments,
bonuses were offered to most new UI claimants.  To restrict a bonus
program to dislocated workers would imply significant changes in the
type of workers eligible to participate in the program, since dislocated
workers tend to be older and earn higher wages than the average UI
claimant.  Also, restricting a bonus program to dislocated workers
would mean implementing the program on a smaller scale than
occurred during the experiments.12
A variant of the model developed in the previous section can pro-
vide insight into whether a bonus program that was available only to
dislocated workers would yield different results than were observed in
the reemployment bonus experiments.  That is, it is possible to model
both the change in the population of workers who would be offered the
bonus and the change in the scale of the program (relative to the exper-
196 Davidson and Woodbury
iment) by adding appropriate subgroups to the model and assuming the
bonus is offered only to a specific (and relatively small) group of work-
ers.
To consider dislocated workers, we use a model similar to that
developed in the appendix, but with one main difference.  Rather than
assume that the labor market has a single sector, we assume the exist-
ence of two employment sectors—high wage and low wage.  Worker
dislocation is treated by assuming that the economy experiences a one-
time shock that causes part of the high-wage sector to shut down.  Dis-
located workers in the model are former employees of the high-wage
sector who must now seek low-wage employment.  In contrast, high-
wage workers who experience a regular layoff search for (and eventu-
ally find) a high-wage job.  Hence, in this model, there are three groups
of UI-eligible claimants: 1) low-wage UI-eligible claimants, 2) high-
wage UI-eligible claimants, and 3) dislocated UI-eligible claimants.13
In this modified model, the bonus offer to dislocated workers
increases the opportunity cost of unemployment for dislocated workers
and results in increased search effort on their part.  For example, in a
model in which half of all UI-eligible claimants are high-wage workers
and 15 percent of all initial claimants for UI are dislocated, the search
effort of dislocated workers increases by approximately 30 percent.
This increase in search effort of dislocated workers has the same
employment and crowding-out effects that were discussed on pp. 185–
186.  However, the employment effect is smaller than when the bonus
is offered to all UI claimants because the group being offered the
bonus—dislocated workers—is a relatively small portion of the labor
force.  The model’s results suggest that the crowding-out effects of a
bonus program for dislocated workers would be far greater than the
crowding-out effects of a bonus program for most UI claimants pre-
cisely because of this smaller employment effect.
Table 6.3 shows the impacts of a reemployment bonus targeted on
dislocated workers (column 1) and comparable results from a bonus
offer to all UI claimants (column 2).  In both sets of results, we
assume that 60 percent of all unemployed workers are ineligible for UI
(q = 0.6) and that 65 percent of UI-eligible workers claim their bene-
fits (k = 0.65).  The results in column 1 are based on the assumptions
that half of all workers are high-wage workers and that 17.6 percent of
low-wage UI-eligible claimants were dislocated from the high-wage
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sector.  As we have shown in Davidson and Woodbury (2000, Tables
7A and 7B), the results in column 1 are robust to significant variation
in both the percentage of the labor market that is high wage and the
percentage of workers who are dislocated.  Note that we have not
divided dislocated workers into those who respond to the bonus offer
and those who do not respond.  This could be done at a cost of consid-
erable added complexity, but the main points made presently would
not change.
The main result is that a reemployment bonus targeted on dislo-
cated workers would increase employment of dislocated workers (by
447 per 100,000 labor force participants) and decrease their unemploy-
ment duration (by about 0.9 week), but these gains for dislocated work-
Table 6.3 Changes in Employment and in Duration of Unemployment 
Resulting from a $500 Reemployment Bonus Offered Only to 
Dislocated Workersa
Worker group (1)b (2)b







High wage –93 
(0.016)
—
Low wage –152 
(0.025)
—








Net increase in employment (J) 4 118
SOURCE: Figures in column 1 come from Davidson and Woodbury (2000, Tables 7A
and 7B).  Figures in column 2 are repeated from Column 2 of Table 6.2.
a The top number in a pair of values is the change in employment per 100,000 labor-
force participants; the number in parentheses is the change in unemployment duration
in weeks.  The group that gains from the reemployment bonus offer in each case is
shown by an asterisk (*). 
b In column 1, the bonus offer is made to dislocated workers only.  In column 2, the
offer is made to all UI claimants.
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ers come almost entirely at the expense of other groups of workers, all
of whom suffer employment reductions as a result of the bonus offer to
dislocated workers.  The net increase in employment resulting from a
bonus offered only to dislocated workers is just 4 jobs per 100,000 in
the labor force, as  compared with a net gain of 118 per 100,000 when
the bonus is offered to all UI claimants.  Crowding out is virtually com-
plete in the case of a bonus program targeted on dislocated workers
(the crowding-out ratio equals 0.99).
Crowding out is nearly complete in this case because the employ-
ment gains that result from offering a bonus to a small percentage of
unemployed workers (in this case, dislocated workers) are correspond-
ingly small.  Recall that, in this model, employment gains occur
through increases in the search intensity of workers who are offered an
inducement (such as a bonus) to search harder.  When search intensity
increases, vacancies disappear and more of the total available jobs in
the economy are filled.  If only a few workers are offered a bonus,
employment rises only modestly.14
If the crowding-out effects of the bonus to dislocated workers are
as large as our results suggest, then such a bonus fails miserably the
Pareto criterion.  However, for three reasons, we would not conclude
that a bonus program for dislocated workers should be ruled out.  First,
worker dislocation results from structural changes in the economy that
presumably benefit the majority of workers and society at the expense
of dislocated workers.  It is the burden of structural change, which
itself fails the Pareto criterion, that the reemployment bonus is intended
to redress.  Second, as discussed in detail elsewhere (Davidson and
Woodbury 2000, section III.E), the crowding-out results outlined above
are quite sensitive to the assumption that full employment (or the total
number of available jobs, F) is fixed and exogenous.  Specifically, we
find that if employers responded to a bonus for dislocated workers by
increasing labor demand by just 0.025 to 0.03 percent, there would be
no crowding out of nondislocated workers.  
Exogenous Economic Factors and Differences among the Illinois, 
Pennsylvania, and Washington Experiments
Chapter 4 showed that the reemployment bonus experiments in
Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Washington produced varied results.  In Illi-
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nois, a $500 cash bonus offer for finding reemployment within 11
weeks of claiming unemployment benefits resulted in a reduction of
the expected duration of unemployment of 0.7 week for claimants eli-
gible only for state regular benefits (that is, ineligible for FSC).  In the
Pennsylvania and Washington experiments, similar bonus offers
reduced the expected duration of unemployment by 0.6 and by 0.34
week, respectively.  Also, in the Illinois experiment, the impact of the
bonus offer varied greatly depending on the potential duration of UI
benefits.  For workers eligible for 38 weeks of benefits as a result of
Federal Supplemental Compensation (FSC), the bonus offer reduced
the expected duration of unemployment by 1.75 weeks, whereas for
otherwise similar workers eligible only for state regular benefits, it
reduced unemployment duration by only 0.7 week (Davidson and
Woodbury 1991).
The model developed in this chapter can provide some limited
insight into why the bonus offers in Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Wash-
ington had such varied impacts.  The exogenous economic factors that
determine the efficacy of a bonus offer can be divided into supply and
demand factors.  On the supply side, we have anything that influences
the job-search behavior of unemployed workers.  The size of the bonus
offer (and qualification period), the level and potential duration of UI
benefits, and the expected reemployment wage all influence the search
intensity of jobless workers.  These supply factors provide at least a
partial explanation of why the bonus offer had such a large impact on
FSC-eligible workers in Illinois.  When the potential duration of UI
benefits is extended from 26 to 38 weeks (other things equal), as it was
by the FSC program, optimal search intensity of UI recipients falls
(that is, expected utility maximizing search intensity is reduced).  This
follows because an increase in the potential duration of UI benefits
reduces the opportunity cost of being unemployed.  If the marginal cost
of search intensity increases with search intensity (that is, the opportu-
nity cost of leisure is increasing), then in the absence of a bonus pro-
gram, FSC-eligible workers would search less hard and face a lower
marginal cost of search than workers who were eligible for only 26
weeks of benefits.  Because FSC-eligible workers face a lower mar-
ginal cost of search, a bonus offer should induce a larger increase in
their search intensity.  The larger bonus-induced increase in search
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intensity of the FSC-eligibles implies a larger bonus impact for these
workers.15
On the demand side of the model, we have the job separation rate
(s) and the total number of available jobs (F).  Low separation rates (s)
and rising availability of jobs (F) are both consistent with lower equi-
librium unemployment rates, but low separation rates and rising avail-
ability of jobs have opposite implications for the effectiveness of a
bonus program.  When s is low, jobs do not turnover rapidly, so there
are few vacancies (that is, unemployment is low because expected job
duration is high).  With few vacancies, it is difficult to find a job.  So
when s is low, a bonus offer will have a relatively small impact (David-
son and Woodbury 1993, Tables 1 through 4).  On the other hand, when
F grows, unemployment falls because there are a growing number of
vacancies; so, jobs are easy to find and the increase in search effort
induced by the bonus program should lead to a large reduction in
unemployment duration (see again Davidson and Woodbury 1993,
Tables 1 through 4).
So how can the differences across and within the Illinois, Pennsyl-
vania, and Washington bonus experiments be explained?  Across states,
the bonus response was larger in Illinois, where the unemployment rate
was high, than it was in Pennsylvania and Washington, where the
unemployment rate was much lower.  A possible explanation is that the
Illinois experiment was conducted during the early stages of the 1980s
recovery, whereas the Pennsylvania and Washington experiments took
place after the recovery had matured.  In Illinois, then, the separation
rate (s) was falling from a high level and the number of available jobs
(F) was growing as the recovery progressed.  The high but falling sepa-
ration rate would be consistent with a large but declining bonus impact,
and the ready availability of jobs would be consistent with a large
bonus impact.  In Pennsylvania and Washington, on the other hand,
separation rates were low and the number of available jobs, although
high, was no longer growing rapidly.  The low separation rate and slow
growth of available jobs would both be consistent with a smaller bonus
impact.
Within all three experiments, the bonus response was larger in
areas with low unemployment.  A plausible explanation is that differ-
ences in local unemployment rates are due to the massing of vacancies
rather than to differences in local turnover rates.  That is, within Illi-
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nois, Pennsylvania, or Washington, differences in unemployment rates
would result more from variation in the availability of jobs (F) across
local labor markets than from variation in the separation rate (s).  If so,
then we would expect a larger bonus impact in local labor markets with
low unemployment rates because low local unemployment rates reflect
ready availability of jobs (rather than low turnover rates).
Although these explanations of the differences within and across
the three experiments are connected to a consistent labor market
model, they must be viewed as speculative in the absence of local labor
market data on separation rates and job vacancies.  
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Designers of social experiments often pay little attention to
whether the results of an experiment will be “externally valid” or trans-
ferable to a program setting.  Clearly, the reason for devoting public
funds to social experiments is to learn what would be the actual effects
of programs that might be adopted.  To ignore the transferability of an
experiment is to invite experimental results that may say little about
what policymakers want and need to know.
This chapter has examined the pitfalls in applying the results of the
reemployment bonus experiments to what might be expected under a
reemployment bonus program.  The first section provides a model-
based catalog of the problems that impede direct application of the
results of an experiment to an actual program: spillover effects, classi-
fication changes without efficiency implications (including increases in
the UI and bonus take-up rates), behavioral changes with efficiency
implications (including changes in the bonus response rate), scale
effects (including targeting a program on a specific group), and exoge-
nous economic changes.
In the second section, we apply a model that is fully described in
the chapter appendix to the five issues that are most important to trans-
ferring the results of the bonus experiments to a program setting.  We
examine the crowding-out effects of the bonus and find that increas-
ingly realistic assumptions about the UI take-up rate and the bonus
response rate suggest increasing degrees of crowding out.  For exam-
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ple, if all UI-eligible workers claim benefits and respond to the bonus,
then for each job gained by bonus-offered claimants, only 0.39 worker
who was not offered the bonus is crowded out of employment (we refer
to this as a crowding-out ratio of 0.39).  But, if we assume more realis-
tically that only 65 percent of UI-eligible workers claim benefits and
only 49 percent of the bonus-offered workers respond to the offer, the
crowding-out ratio rises to 0.76.  That is, the estimate of the crowding-
out effect of the bonus program nearly doubles when we make realistic
assumptions about the UI take-up rate and the bonus response rate.
The reason for this increase in crowding out is that a reduced take-up
of UI and less response to the bonus offer imply that fewer workers
increase their search intensity as a result of the bonus offer.  It follows
that the net increase in employment resulting from the bonus offer is
less, and the scope for crowding out is greater.
Pages 191–192 provide a fuller explanation of how an increase in
the UI take-up rate would increase the government’s cost of financing a
bonus program but would have no implications for employment, unem-
ployment, or the timing of reemployment.  Accordingly, we refer to it
as a classification change without efficiency implications.  We also sug-
gest that an increase in the UI take-up rate should not, in itself, be
viewed as an adverse outcome of a bonus program.  
On pages 192–195, we provide an estimate of the bonus response
rate (ρ), which cannot be observed directly, but which can be solved for
in the model.  The estimate suggests that about half of all bonus-
offered claimants responded to the bonus offer by increasing the inten-
sity of their job search.  Also, we estimate that these “bonus respond-
ers” shortened their unemployment spells by about 1.7 weeks on
average, compared with an average reduction of 0.7 weeks among all
workers who were offered the bonus.  We also obtain results suggesting
that a modest increase in the bonus response rate of about 10 percent
(that is, from 49 percent to 55 percent) would greatly improve the out-
comes of a bonus program: the net increase in jobs resulting from the
bonus program would roughly double and the crowding-out ratio
would drop from 0.76 to 0.64.
We also provide estimates of the likely impacts of a bonus program
that targets dislocated workers (pp. 195–198).  The results suggest that
a bonus program for dislocated workers would increase the employ-
ment and reduce the duration of unemployment (by 0.9 week per spell)
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of dislocated workers, but these gains for dislocated workers would be
almost wholly at the expense of other (nondislocated) workers (crowd-
ing-out ratio = 0.99).  The reason for this virtually complete crowding-
out is that the net increase in employment resulting from a bonus pro-
gram for dislocated workers would be negligible because dislocated
workers are a relatively small group.  That is, because a bonus program
for dislocated workers would induce only a small group of workers to
increase their job-search intensity, the resulting employment increases
would be correspondingly small.  
Finally, we attempt an explanation of the differences in observed
bonus impacts across and within the Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Wash-
ington bonus experiments (pp. 198–201).  First, similar bonus offers
produced larger effects in Illinois (where the unemployment rate was
high) than in Pennsylvania or Washington (where the unemployment
rates were low).  Second, within each state, better labor market condi-
tions (lower unemployment rates in a local labor market) were associ-
ated with larger bonus impacts.  We explain these two apparently
conflicting observations by referring to the model and noting that a low
job separation rate (s) and growing number of available jobs (F) are
consistent with a low unemployment rate, but a high job separation rate
(s) and a growing number of available jobs (F) are consistent with a
large bonus impact.  We speculate that the relatively large bonus effect
in Illinois was due to the high (albeit falling) separation rate and grow-
ing availability of jobs during the Illinois experiment, which occurred
during the most robust part of the expansion of the 1980s.  Both the
Pennsylvania and Washington experiments were conducted later in the
expansion, when the separation rate would have been low and job
growth relatively slow.  Both conditions would be consistent with rela-
tively small bonus effects.  Also, we speculate that the inverse relation
between the size of the bonus effect and the unemployment rate within
each of the experiments is a result of variation in the availability of job
vacancies across the experimental sites.  That is, growth in the avail-
ability of jobs would be the main reason for the relatively large bonus
effects that occurred in local areas where the unemployment rate was
low.
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Notes
1. In fact, crowding out could compromise the internal validity as well as the trans-
ferability of experimental results.  In the bonus experiments, if the reemployment
prospects of control group members were harmed by the increased search inten-
sity of bonus-offered claimants, then the experimental results would overstate the
effect of the bonus program.  Because the number of bonus-offered claimants was
small in relation to the labor markets in which bonus-offered workers were
searching, and because there was no incentive for employers to hire bonus-offered
claimants rather than other applicants, it seems unlikely that crowding out would
have compromised the internal validity of the bonus experiments.
2. Learning effects and time-horizon effects, although related, are distinct.  For
example, an experiment could be long enough for participants to be convinced of
the experiment’s legitimacy, to understand the consequences of their behavior,
and to have all the time needed to make adjustments.  If their planning horizons
exceed the experiment’s duration, however, time-horizon problems could arise.
Learning effects may also occur as a result of changes in the behavior of program
administrators.
3. The model imposes three simplifying assumptions that need to be recognized.
First, the total number of jobs available in the economy (or the demand for labor)
is considered fixed; that is, there is no attempt to model employers’ demand for
labor.  This could be an important shortcoming if a policy change could have a
significant impact on labor demand.  Second, the size of the labor force (L) is
exogenous; that is, we do not model the labor force participation decision,
although one could do so.  Third, the wage rate is exogenous in the models we use
below, although again one could endogenize the wage rate if thee were reasons for
doing so.  In an early version of the model, we did endogenize the wage in a bar-
gaining framework (Davidson and Woodbury 1990).
4. There is also a third, relatively subtle effect: as the reemployment probabilities of
workers who are not offered the bonus (or do not respond) change, their optimal
search effort changes.  As it becomes more difficult for the workers who are not
offered the bonus (or do not respond) to find jobs, their search effort adjusts.  We
refer to this as the rivalry effect but do not discuss it in detail here because it turns
out to be extremely small (see Davidson and Woodbury 2000).
5. With both take-up rates equal to 100 percent, the model is identical to the one
used in Davidson and Woodbury (1993).  The results reported in Table 6.2, col-
umn 1 are the same as in Table 2, column 4 of that paper.
6. Meyer (1995) also suggested three additional reasons for increased UI take-up in
response to a bonus program.  First, he wrote that voluntary job changers would
claim UI benefits and prolong their jobless spells in order to receive the bonus
(p. 109).  However, since voluntary separations with reemployment within 3
months (the longest bonus qualification period that has been considered) are not
eligible for UI, these workers would not be eligible for either UI or a bonus.
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Second, Meyer was concerned about the significant number of dislocated
workers who arrange a new job without an intervening spell of unemployment.
The concern is that, with a bonus program, these workers would arrange for the
new job to start a week or two after the old job ends, in order to receive a week of
UI benefits and collect a bonus.  This would be a clear abuse of the system
because these workers could have obtained work earlier but chose not to.  In
effect, these workers would not satisfy the work-search test for UI—they would
not be able, available, and searching for work—and hence should not be eligible
for UI or a bonus.
Third, he wrote that firms would alter their temporary layoff behavior in
response to implementation of a bonus (pp. 109–110).  However, since recalled
individuals would not receive a bonus by design, temporary layoff behavior would
not be influenced by the presence of a bonus.  (Meyer pointed out that about one-
third of layoffs that start out as temporary end up as permanent, but the purpose of
temporary layoff with recall is to keep the temporarily laid-off workers—workers
with specific skills who the employer wants to rehire when demand recovers—
from taking alternative employment.  In cases where the employer’s expectations
were wrong, and the workers are not recalled, the bonus qualification period
would have expired.)
The first two points above do raise issues of enforcement and fraud prevention.
The existence of a bonus program would increase the importance of ensuring that
workers who quit voluntarily did not receive benefits (and, possibly, a bonus).
Also, the UI agency would need to verify that a worker who applied for a bonus
had not arranged to delay a new job start so as to receive UI benefits and a bonus.
Employers would generally be willing to cooperate in this kind of enforcement,
since their payroll taxes are experience rates (that is, linked to the extent to which
laid-off workers receive UI benefits).  Clearly, these are real costs of administer-
ing a bonus program that require consideration.
7. This is consistent with existing evidence on take-up of UI.  See, for example,
Bland and Card (1991), Vroman (1991), and Anderson and Meyer (1994).
8. It is possible that some UI-eligible nonclaimants with an expected duration of
unemployment of slightly longer than the qualification period might claim bene-
fits and increase their job-search intensity in order to qualify for the bonus.  This
increased search intensity would imply an added real economic benefit of
increased UI take-up, in return to the bonus expense.  In contrast, it would make
little sense for a UI-eligible nonclaimant with a long expected duration of unem-
ployment (for example, a professional worker facing a low UI replacement rate)
to become a claimant after adoption of a bonus program, since the bonus offer
would not change the payoff to claiming UI benefits.  (If the payoff to claiming
were changed by the bonus offer and this worker did claim benefits, then the
implication would be that the bonus offer would raise job-search intensity and
have real economic benefits.)
9. There would be a social cost of the added transfers if the taxes levied to finance
them distorted economic incentives in some way.  The UI payroll tax may well
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create such incentives (see, for example, the review by Topel 1990), but the
amount of the transfers in question is not great in this case.
10. The estimate of 0.49 is similar to the proportion of bonus-offered workers in Illi-
nois who found reemployment within 11 weeks and filed a Notice of Hire, which
was 0.56 (Spiegelman and Woodbury 1987, Chapter 7).  In Illinois, workers were
asked to submit a Notice of Hire at the time of reemployment if they wanted to
collect a bonus.  The Notice of Hire was mainly a monitoring device that helped
the experimenters to track the progress of the experiment and ensure that the
bonus budget would not be exceeded.  It also may have some behavioral content,
however, as suggested by the correspondence between the proportion submitting a
Notice of Hire and the estimated ρ.
11. The correspondence between workers who meet likely profiling criteria and dislo-
cated workers is incomplete.  In the model, dislocated workers are those who have
lost high-wage jobs and have little expectation of returning to such jobs.  Hence,
they have long expected durations of unemployment and would meet most con-
ceivable profiling criteria.
12. Nevertheless, Spiegelman, O’Leary, and Kline (1992) found no difference
between the bonus responses of dislocated and nondislocated workers in the
Washington Reemployment Bonus experiment.
13. For a full description of the model, see Davidson and Woodbury (2000).
14. Recall that the bonus offer can increase employment even though full employment
(or the total number of available jobs, F) is fixed in the model.  Because F = V + J
(total available jobs equal the sum of vacancies and jobs that are filled), induce-
ments to search harder cause V to fall and J to rise.
15. By similar reasoning, workers who receive large weekly benefits and those who
expect lower wages after reemployment would be expected to search less hard
than workers who receive small weekly benefits or who face high wages after
reemployment.  Accordingly, the impacts of a bonus offer should increase with
the weekly benefit amount and decrease with expected wages after reemployment.
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Appendix: A Model for Transferring Experimental 
Results to an External Setting
This appendix provides a statement of the model that underlies the estimates
given in Chapter 6.  Following a discussion of our reasons for choosing the
model we use, three sections offer a narrative development of the model.  The
final section is a full statement of the model’s equations and notation.
The model we use is patterned after the “trade frictions” models of Diamond
(1982), Mortensen (1982), and Pissarides (1984, 1990), among others.  In such
models, the number of contacts between workers and firms is determined by
search effort, a matching (or search) technology, and equilibrium conditions
stating that in steady state, the rate of job creation must equal the rate at which
jobs break-up.  In most models of this kind, job offers are never rejected (but
see Diamond and Maskin [1979] for an exception).
The trade frictions approach we take contrasts with the approach to job
search used more frequently in labor economics, in which unemployed workers
choose a reservation wage and receive job offers that they are free to accept or
reject.  Job offers arrive randomly at an average rate (λ, say) and the wage of-
fers come from a stationary cumulative distribution function F(w).  The rate of
offer arrival and the distribution of wage offers are both exogenous, so that no
attempt is made to model the firm’s side of the labor market or to characterize
the full labor market equilibrium.  Because they consider only labor supply,
models that rely on the reservation wage are commonly referred to as “partial-
partial” models.  In such models, unemployment is tied to the reservation wage
and the rate of job rejection, whereas in the trade frictions approach, unemploy-
ment is determined by search effort and the matching technology.
We have two main reasons for choosing the trade frictions approach.  First,
it is relatively easy to incorporate institutional details of the UI system into a
trade frictions model because this approach offers a natural way to model the
progress of job search over time and to model changes in incentives that occur
over the course of a spell of insured unemployment.  The reemployment bonus
and the UI system in which it is embedded both generate exogenous changes
in search incentives that occur at discrete times during the unemployment spell,
and it is essential that these be captured in our model.  Atkinson et al. (1984)
and Atkinson and Micklewright (1991) have also noted the difficulty of incor-
porating institutional detail in partial-partial models.
Second, it is very difficult to implement the partial-partial approach empir-
ically because it places severe demands on our knowledge of the labor mar-
ket—for example, knowledge of the wage-offer distribution, F(w).  In
particular, quantitative predictions of partial-partial models are highly sensitive
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to the wage-offer distribution and other underlying parameters.  (See Marshall
and Zarkin [1987] for a discussion of the importance of distinguishing the un-
observable wage-offer distribution from the observable wage distribution.)  Al-
though in the trade frictions approach, different assumptions about underlying
parameters (both observable and unobservable) generate different quantitative
predictions, we show below that it is possible to estimate the underlying unob-
servable parameters.  We find that the model’s implications are quite robust to
variations in those parameters.
ASSUMPTIONS, DEFINITIONS, AND NOTATION
This section gives a description of the variables and notation included in the
full model, focusing on its main features.  In describing the model, we make
frequent reference to Figures 6A.1 and 6A.2, which depict the groups of work-
ers treated in the model and the labor market flows analyzed in the model.
We begin by dividing all workers into four classes:
1) Employed workers—denoted by J.
2) Unemployed UI-ineligible workers—Ui.  This group (about 60 percent
of unemployed workers) includes mainly new entrants and re-entrants to
the labor force and workers who have too little work experience during
the last year or so to make them eligible for UI.  The group also includes
workers who are ineligible for UI benefits because they voluntarily quit
their previous job or were terminated for cause.
3) Unemployed UI-eligible nonclaimants—Uk.  These job seekers are eligi-
ble for UI benefits but choose not to claim them.  This group appears to
have grown dramatically over the past 15 years, and it has been the sub-
ject of considerable research and debate (Blank and Card 1991; Vroman
1991).
4) Unemployed UI-eligible claimants—Uj, t and Uj, x.  Four groups of UI-
eligible claimants are considered in the model (see the upper left quad-
rant of Figure 6A.1).  First, there are UI eligibles who respond to the
bonus offer by increasing their search intensity and qualify for the bonus
by gaining reemployment within 11 weeks.  We denote these responders
who qualify for the bonus by Ur, t (t ≤ 6).1   Second, there are UI-eligi-
bles who fail to respond to the bonus offer (that is, do not increase search
effort) but qualify for the bonus nonetheless by gaining reemployment
within 11 weeks.  We denote this group by Unr, t (t ≤ 6).  Third, there are
UI eligibles who respond to the bonus but fail to qualify because they
don’t gain reemployment within 11 weeks.  We denote this group by Ur,t
(t > 6).  (A subcategory of this third group is made up of workers who
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respond to the bonus but fail to qualify for the bonus and ultimately
exhaust their UI benefits.  We denote these workers by Ur,x.)  Finally,
there are UI eligibles who neither respond to the bonus offer nor find
reemployment within 11 weeks, denoted by Unr, t (t > 6).  (A subcate-
gory of this last group is made up of workers who don’t respond to the
bonus and ultimately exhaust their UI benefits, denoted by Unr,x.)
The latter three categories of workers are depicted and summarized in Figure
6A.1.
Three issues relating to unemployed workers who are UI-eligible and claim
their benefits (class 4 above) deserve further mention.  First, note that all UI-
eligible claimants are offered a cash bonus for rapid reemployment.  To actu-
ally qualify for the bonus, a UI-eligible claimant must gain reemployment
within 11 weeks of filing his or her UI claim.  (In practice, a worker also needed
to hold the job for four months in order to qualify for the bonus.)
Second, in modeling the reemployment bonus, we want to pay attention to
two issues.  The first is that the response to the reemployment bonus program
was less than 100 percent, in that not all workers who were offered the bonus
responded to the offer by increasing their search intensity.  We denote the pro-
portion of bonus-offered workers who did respond to the bonus offer by ρ; this
bonus response rate cannot be observed, but can be solved for in the model.  In
Figure 6A.1, ρ equals the number of claimants in the upper two quadrants of
UI-eligible claimants divided by all UI-eligible claimants.  The second issue is
Figure 6A.1 Groups of Unemployed Workers Considered in the Model
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that not all workers who qualified for the bonus collected it.  That is, the bonus
take-up rate was less than 100 percent, as discussed in Chapter 3.  We denote
the bonus take-up rate, which can be observed, by τ, and set τ = 0.55 based on
the Illinois experiment (see Woodbury and Spiegelman 1987, Table 7).  The
parameter τ is not shown in Figure 6A.1, but equals the number of bonus recip-
ients divided by the number of claimants in two left quadrants of UI-eligible
claimants.  (Note that it is possible for a worker to collect a bonus without re-
sponding to the bonus incentive.)  As will be seen below, the ability to observe
the bonus take-up rate allows us to identify the bonus response rate.
Third, workers who have exhausted their entitlement to UI benefits are an
important subgroup of UI-eligibles.  We use Uj, x (where j = r for workers who
respond to the bonus and j = nr for workers who fail to respond) to denote the
number of eligible claimants with t > 14.  That is, we assume that UI claimants
exhaust their benefit entitlement after a continuous spell of 28 weeks (14 two-
week periods) of unemployment.2
It is also important to remark further on UI-eligible nonclaimants (class 3
above).  Blank and Card (1991) found that only 65 to 75 percent of the unem-
ployed workers who are eligible for UI benefits actually claim those benefits;
Vroman (1991) obtained an even lower estimate of about 55 percent.  Accord-
ingly, we use k to denote the UI take-up rate and set k = 0.65.  Thus, we make
the appropriate assumption that only 65 percent of all UI-eligible workers
claim their UI benefits.  Also, we assume that the search behavior of UI-eligi-
ble nonclaimants is unaffected by changes in UI policy, such as changes in ben-
efit amounts or the introduction of a bonus.  This should be a relatively
uncontroversial assumption, since it is unlikely that a worker who fails to claim
UI benefits would behave as if he or she were receiving a weekly benefit.
Finally, we assume that workers who do not collect bonuses for which they
qualify behave as if they were never offered a bonus.  This assumption is more
questionable, since it is possible that a bonus-offered worker might increase
search intensity with the intention of collecting a bonus but never follow
through.
EQUATIONS OF THE MODEL
The model consists of five sets of equations: accounting identities, steady-
state conditions, reemployment probabilities, expected lifetime income, and
level of search effort.  For reference, these equations are written out on pp.
216–219.  Figure 6A.2 depicts the flows of workers through various labor mar-
ket states that are modeled.  Stocks of workers in different states are shown as
rectangles and the arrows indicate the transition rates of workers from one state
to another.
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Figure 6A.2 Labor Market Flows in the Model
Accounting identities
Let F denote the total number of jobs available in the economy and let V rep-
resent the number of vacancies in the steady-state equilibrium.  Since all jobs
are either filled or vacant, the first identity is F = J + V (Equation 1, p. 216).
The second identity states that all workers must be either employed or unem-
ployed.  Letting L denote the total number of workers and U total unemploy-
ment, the second identity is L = J + U (Equation 2).  The third identity simply
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states that total unemployment equals the sum of the various subgroups of un-
employed (Equation 3).
Steady-state conditions
The steady-state equations (p. 216) equate the flows into and out of each
employment state.  If these equations are satisfied, then total unemployment
and its composition remain constant over time.  For example, consider the flow
of workers into state Ui—UI-ineligible unemployment.  We use s to denote the
separation rate—the fraction of jobs from which workers separate (voluntarily
or involuntarily) in each period.  Thus, sJ workers lose their job in each period.
If we let q denote the fraction of unemployed workers who are UI-ineligible (q
= 0.65), then qsJ is the flow of workers into UI-ineligible unemployment, and
(1 – q)sJ is the flow of workers into UI-eligible unemployment.  (This latter
group is divided into UI-eligible nonclaimants, UI claimants who respond to
the bonus offer, and UI claimants who fail to respond to the bonus offer.)  To
calculate the flow out of UI-ineligibility (state Ui), let mi denote the reemploy-
ment probability for any UI-ineligible worker.  Then miUi unemployed UI-in-
eligible workers find jobs in any given period, and this represents the flow out
of state Ui.  In a steady-state equilibrium, Ui must remain constant over time.
Therefore, we must have qsJ = miUi (Equation 4).
Consider next the three groups of UI-eligible workers.  Again, the total flow
of workers into UI-eligible unemployment is (1 – q)sJ.  Since the proportion of
UI-eligibles who claim benefits equals k, the proportion of UI-eligibles who do
not claim benefits equals 1 – k.  Accordingly, the flow of workers into UI-eli-
gible nonclaimant status (state Uk) is (1 – k)(1 – q)sJ (see again Figure 6A.2).
This flow must equal the flow of workers out of state Uk.  Since the reemploy-
ment probability of UI-eligible nonclaimants is mk, the flow out of Uk equals
mkUk, and the steady-state condition is (1 – k)(1 – q)sJ = mkUk (Equation 5).
Next, some UI claimants (a proportion ρ) respond to the bonus, whereas oth-
ers (1 – ρ) do not.  As a result, the number of newly unemployed workers who
respond to the bonus each period is (1 – ρ)k(1 – q)sJ, and the number of newly
unemployed workers who do not respond to the bonus is ρk(1 – q)sJ.  These
are the flows into states Ur,1 and Unr,1.  In steady-state, all workers in states Ur,1
and Unr,1 at the beginning of a period flow out by the end of the period.  Work-
ers in state Ur,1 flow either back to J or into Ur,2, and workers in state Unr,1 flow
into either back to J or into Unr, 2.  Hence, the flow out of Ur,1 in each period
[mr,1Ur,1 + (1 – mr,1)Ur,1] equals Ur,1, and the flow out of Unr,1 in each period
[mnr,1Unr,1 + (1 – mnr,1)Unr,1] equals Unr,1.  It follows that the steady-state con-
ditions for these two states are (1 – ρ)k(1 – q)sJ = Ur,1 and ρk × (1 – q)sJ = Unr,1
(Equations 6 and 7).
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The last two steady-state equations (8 and 9) are the analogous steady-state
equations for all of the remaining states of unemployment.
Reemployment probabilities
Equations 10 through 14 define the probability of reemployment for any
given unemployed worker as a function of the search intensity of both the giv-
en worker and all other workers, and the number of vacancies.  We denote the
reemployment probabilities by m (for match probability, with appropriate sub-
scripts).  Each reemployment probability is in turn a product of three other
probabilities: the probability of a worker contacting a firm (this is the work-
er’s job-search intensity), the probability that a contacted firm has a job va-
cancy, and the probability that the worker gets a job offer, conditional on
applying to a firm that has a vacancy.  For example, let pk denote the probabil-
ity that a UI-eligible nonclaimant contacts a firm in the tth period of search (or
the number of firms contacted, if pk > 1).  (The terms pj,t and pi refer to similar
probabilities of UI-eligible claimants [with j = r for claimants who respond to
the bonus and j = nr for claimants who fail to respond to the bonus] and UI-in-
eligibles, respectively.)  Again, these contact probabilities are a measure of a
worker’s search intensity.  Next, assuming that workers choose firms at ran-
dom, the probability that any given firm has a vacancy is V/T.  Finally, if we
let λ denote the average number of applications filed per firm, then the proba-
bility that a worker gets a job conditional on applying at a firm with a vacancy
is (1 – e–λ)/λ (see Davidson and Woodbury 1993 for details).  So the probabil-
ity of an unemployed UI-eligible claimant in the tth period of search finding a
job is given by the product mj, t = pj, t(V/T)[(1 – e–λ/λ)].  There is an analogous
reemployment probability equation for each state of unemployment (Equa-
tions 10 through 14).
The probability of reemployment increases with search effort, but increas-
ing search effort is costly.  We assume that the cost of search effort is given by
a cost function—cpz—where z (> 1) and c are search cost parameters.  More
precisely, z denotes the elasticity of search costs with respect to search effort
and c is a constant that transforms the number of firm contacts (p) into cost
units.  The form of the cost function implies that search cost increases with
search intensity at an increasing rate.  We assume that c differs between UI-el-
igible and UI-ineligible workers but that z is the same for all groups of workers.
Expected lifetime income and level of search effort
The fourth and fifth sets of equations are used to calculate the optimal search
effort of unemployed workers.  In Equations 15 through 22, we calculate the
expected lifetime income of workers in each possible state of unemployment
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and employment.  Then, in  Equations 23 through 26, we calculate the level of
search effort that maximizes these expected lifetime incomes.
Expected lifetime income is calculated by considering both the current and
future prospects faced by the worker.  For example, let Vr,t denote the expected
lifetime income for a UI claimant (one who responds to the bonus) in the tth
period of unemployment, Vw denote the expected lifetime income for an em-
ployed UI-eligible worker, w the wage, B the bonus amount, and x the per-pe-
riod UI benefit.  This UI claimant in the tth period of search receives x – c(pr,t)z
(that is, UI benefits less the cost of search).  With probability mr, t this worker
finds a job and can expect to earn Vr,w in the future, and if t < 6, this worker
may also collect a bonus.  With probability 1 – mr,t the worker remains unem-
ployed and can expect to earn Vr,t + 1 in the future.  Therefore,
Vr,t = x – c(pr, t)z + [mr, t(Vr, w + B) + (1 – mr, t)Vr, t + 1]/(1 + r).
Note that future income is discounted at interest rate r.  For t > 6, Vr,t takes
the same form as above, except that the worker cannot collect a bonus upon
finding a job.  An analogous condition describes the expected lifetime income
for workers in every other state of unemployment and employment (again, see
Equations 15 through 22).
Finally, for each unemployed worker, search effort is chosen to maximize
expected lifetime income.  Therefore, there is an equation defining optimal
search effort for each possible state of unemployment, with one exception.  The
exception is for UI-eligible nonclaimants.  The most likely reason that some
UI-eligible workers do not file for UI benefits is that they do not expect to be
unemployed for a significant length of time—that is, they expect to be able to
find jobs relatively easily and with little effort.  For these workers, the cost of
claiming benefits may well outweigh the value of the benefits that would be re-
ceived.  Therefore, we treat these workers differently, assigning them high re-
employment probabilities and ignoring their search decision.  Provided that
their reemployment probabilities are set high enough (so that their expected du-
ration of unemployment is roughly half the expected duration faced by UI-eli-
gible claimants), our results are not sensitive to the assumption that their
reemployment probability is high.3
MODEL SOLUTION
To examine the impact of the reemployment bonus program on groups of
workers other than those offered the bonus, we first solve the model with the
bonus amount set to zero (B = 0), then solve it again with the bonus amount set
to $500 (B = 500), and compare the results.  In solving the model, we make use
of the data that were gathered for the Illinois reemployment bonus experiment
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for as many of the model’s variables and parameters as possible and use sec-
ondary data sources where necessary (for a discussion, see Davidson and
Woodbury 2000).  Also, we use the behavioral responses that were observed to
the Illinois reemployment bonus in calibrating the model.  The Illinois experi-
ment was used to calibrate the model because the treatment impacts for FSC-
ineligible workers were essentially similar to the average impacts in the Penn-
sylvania and Washington experiments (Davidson and Woodbury 1996).  The
details of this approach to solving the model follow.
The key endogenous variables in the model are employment (J), the number
of each type of unemployed worker in each state of unemployment (the U
terms), the reemployment probabilities for unemployed workers in each state
of unemployment (the m terms), the search effort of unemployed workers in
each state of unemployment (the p terms), and the proportion of UI-eligible
claimants who respond to the bonus (ρ).  The key parameters are the wage (w),
the interest rate (r), the size of the bonus (B), the level of unemployment ben-
efits (x), total jobs available (F), the total number of workers (L), the job sepa-
ration rate (s), the fraction of unemployed workers who are ineligible for UI
benefits (q), the UI take-up rate (k), and the search cost parameters (z and c).
Except for the search cost parameters, estimates of all of these parameters can
be obtained either from the data collected to analyze the Illinois experiment or
from other sources.
To obtain estimates of the search cost parameters, we follow the procedure
developed in earlier work (Davidson and Woodbury 1993).  First, we note that
in the absence of a reemployment bonus, the expected duration of unemploy-
ment for UI claimants was 22.4 weeks (this was the average unemployment du-
ration for the control group in the Illinois experiment).  We then arbitrarily
choose a value of z and solve the model to find the value of c that is consistent
with the model predicting the expected duration of unemployment (22.4
weeks) that was observed for UI claimants who were not offered a reemploy-
ment bonus (that is, for whom B = 0).  This gives us a pair (z,c) for every z.
Next, we solve the model again, but with B = 500 (the Illinois bonus offer) for
each (z,c) pair and observe the reduction in the expected duration of unemploy-
ment for UI claimants that is predicted by the model.  We then choose the pair
(z,c) that generates a prediction that is consistent with the outcome observed in
the Illinois experiment.4
The model developed and used here resembles models we have used previ-
ously to examine the crowding-out effects of reemployment bonuses and ef-
fects of wage-rate subsidies paid to dislocated workers (Davidson and
Woodbury 1993, 2000).  Two extensions are embodied in the model used here.
First, the introduction of additional groups of workers, such as UI-eligible non-
claimants and UI claimants who fail to respond to the bonus offer, allows us to
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consider spillover effects, classification changes, behavioral changes, and scale
effects that could not be considered in a simpler model.  Second, introducing
the UI take-up rate (k) and the bonus take-up rate (τ) allows us to make appro-
priate assumptions about these rates, both of which are less than 100 percent.
We show on pp. 195–203 that these extensions lead to markedly different pre-
dictions about the outcomes of adopting a reemployment bonus program.  The
introduction of τ is especially useful, because it allows us to identify the pro-
portion of bonus-offered workers who responded to the bonus by increasing
their search effort (ρ), which cannot be observed directly.
COMPLETE STATEMENT OF THE MODEL
Identities
(1) F = J + V
(2) L = J + U
(3) U = Σj = r,nrΣt = 1,14Uj, t + Ur, x + Unr,x + Uk + Ui
Steady-State Conditions
(4) qsJ = miUi
(5) (1 – k)(1 – q)sJ = mkUk
(6) ρk(1 – q)sJ = Ur,1
(7) (1 – ρ)k(1 – q)sJ = Unr,1
(8) (1 – mj,t – 1)Uj,t – 1 = Uj,t for j = r,nr  (t = 2, . . . , 14)
(9) (1 – mj,14)Uj,14 = mj,xUj,x for j = r,nr
Reemployment Probabilities
(10) mi = pi(V/F)[(1 – e–λ)/λ]
(11) mk = pk(V/F)[(1 – e–λ)/λ]
(12) mj, t = pj, t(V/F)[(1 – e–λ)/λ] for j = r,nr (t = 2, . . . , 14)
(13) mj,x = pj,x(V/F)[(1 – e–λ)/λ] for j = r,nr
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(14) λ = (1/F)[piUi + pkUk + Σj = r,nrΣt = 1,14 pj,tUj,t + pr,xUr,x + pnr,xUnr,x]
Expected Lifetime Utility
(15) Vi = – ci(pi)z + [miVi,w + (1 – mi)Vi]/(1 + r)
(16) Vr, t = x – c(pr,t)z + [mr,t(Vr,w + B) + (1 – mr,t)Vr,t + 1]/(1 + r) for t = 1, . . . , 6
(17) Vr,t = x – c(pr, t)z + [mr,tVr,w + (1 – mr,t)Vr,t + 1]/(1 + r) for t = 7, . . . , 13
(18) Vnr,t = x – c(pnr,t)z + [mnr,tVnr,w + (1 – mnr, t)Vnr, t + 1]/(1 + r) for 
t = 1, . . . , 13
(19) Vj,14 = x – c(pj,14)z + [mj,14Vj,w + (1 – mj,14)Vj,x]/(1 + r) for j = r,nr
(20) Vj,x = – c(pj,x)z + [mj,xVj,w + (1 – mj,x)Vj,x]/(1 + r) for j = r,nr
(21) Vi,w = w + [sVi + (1 – s)Vi,w]/(1 + r)
(22) Vj,w = w + [sVj,1 + (1 – s)Vj,w]/(1 + r) for j = r,nr
Optimal Search Effort
(23) pi = arg max Vi
(24) pj,t = arg max Vj, t for j = r,nr (t = 1, . . . , 14)
(25) pj,x = arg max Vj,x for j = r,nr
(26) pk = pnr,x
Observed Bonus Take-Up Rate
(27) τ = Σt = 1,6mr,tUr, t / [Σt = 1,6mr, tUr, t + Σt = 1,6mnr, tUnr, t]
Summary of Notation
L = the size of the labor force
J = steady-state employment
U = steady-state unemployment
V = steady-state job vacancies
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F = the total number of jobs available
subscripts: r = UI-eligible claimants who respond to the bonus
nr = UI-eligible claimants who do not respond to the bonus 
x = UI-eligible claimants who have exhausted their benefits
i = UI-ineligible unemployed workers
k = UI-eligible nonclaimants
t = the period of search
w = employed workers
Ui = the number of UI-ineligible workers seeking employment
Uk = the number of UI-eligible non-claimants seeking employment
Uj,t = the number of type j UI-eligible workers in their tth period of search 
(j = r,nr)
Uj,x = the number of type j UI-eligible workers who have exhausted their UI 
benefits (j = r,nr)
q = the proportion of unemployed workers who are ineligible for UI
s = the job-separation rate
k = the proportion of UI-eligible workers who claim their benefits (that is, par-
ticipate in the UI program)
ρ = the proportion of UI-eligible claimants who respond to the bonus
mi = the reemployment probability for UI-ineligible workers
mk = the reemployment probability for UI-eligible nonclaimants
mj, t  = the reemployment probability for a type j UI-eligible claimant in the tth
period of search (j = r,nr)
mj,x = the reemployment probability for a type j UI-eligible claimant who has 
exhausted UI benefits (j = r,nr)
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λ = the average number of job applications received per firm
pi = the search intensity of UI-ineligible workers (that is, the probability that a 
UI-ineligible worker contacts a firm, or if greater than 1, the number of firms 
contacted)
pk = the search intensity of UI-eligible nonclaimants
pj,t = the search intensity of a type j UI-eligible claimant in the tth period of 
search (j = r,nr)
pj,x = the search intensity of a type j UI-eligible claimant who has exhausted 
UI benefits (j = r,nr)
Vi = expected lifetime utility of a UI-ineligible unemployed worker
Vj,t = expected lifetime utility of a type j UI-eligible claimant in the tth period 
of search (j = r,nr)
Vj,x = expected lifetime utility of a type j UI-eligible claimant who has 
exhausted UI benefits (j = r,nr)
Vj,w = expected lifetime utility of an employed type j UI-eligible worker 
(j = r,nr)
Vi,w = expected lifetime utility of an employed UI-ineligible worker
x = UI benefit per period
c, ci = search cost parameters
z = the elasticity of search costs with respect to search effort
r = the interest rate
B = the reemployment bonus amount
w = the wage
τ = the observed bonus take-up rate (that is, of UI claimants who qualify for 
the reemployment bonus, the proportion who actually collect it)
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Appendix Notes
1. In the model, a worker qualifies for bonus if t ≤ 6, because we measure time in
two-week intervals.
2. The assumption of continuous unemployment is not wholly correct because about
10 percent of UI recipients experience multiple spells of unemployment in a ben-
efit year.  Nevertheless, a single spell of unemployment characterizes most of the
insured unemployed, so we maintain the assumption.
3. In other words, a lower reemployment probability could be assigned without sub-
stantially changing the results.  The main point is that these workers don’t respond
to the reemployment bonus offer, so the bonus program raises employment by less
than it would otherwise.
4. A different procedure was used to estimate ci the cost parameter for UI-ineligibles
because the expected duration for UI-ineligibles is not observable.  See Davidson
and Woodbury (1993, pp. 587–588) for details.
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